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Should we break up banks and limit bailouts? We study vertical integration of
deposit-taking institutions with those investing in risky equity. Integration eliminates
a credit spread, reducing aggregate banking sector profitability; so while integration
increases output it also entails larger, more frequent bailouts of retail customers.
Bailouts boost economic activity but are costly. The optimal structure of banking
depends on the effi ciency of government intervention, the competitiveness of the
banking sectors and shocks. Separated institutions are preferred when government
bailouts are costly. Optimal bank regulation tolerates profits at investment and
universal banks to limit bailouts, but imposes strict antitrust on retail banks.
JEL Classification: E13, E44; G11; G24; G28.
Keywords: Financial intermediation in macro models, vertical structure of financial
intermediary, separation of retail and investment banks, bailouts, trade-off between
financial stability and effi ciency.
∗Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of this work have benefitted from comments from seminar par-
ticipants at the Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank, the Universities of Birmingham, Cardiff, Durham,
Heriot-Watt, Lancaster, Leicester, Loughborough, Manchester, NYU, Sheffi eld, St Andrews, CEF 2011
meetings in San Francisco, 2011 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2012 Meeting of the Royal
Economic Society, Policy and Growth Conference, Durham University 2013, ESRC 2013 Conference Fi-
nancial Modelling Post-2008: Where Next?, 2015 Macro Workshop at the University of Bath. We also
thank Roberto Billi, Dudley Cooke, Harris Dellas, Martin Ellison, Douglas Gale, Mark Gertler, Boyan
Jovanovic, Campbell Leith, Jesper Linde, João Madeira, Christoph Thoenissen and Tony Yates. We are
especially grateful to two referees and the editor who made a number of very helpful suggestions that
improved the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Tel +44 (0) 191 33 45198. E-mail: Tatiana.Damjanovic@durham.ac.uk.
‡Tel +44 (0) 141 330 8693. E-mail: Charles.Nolan@glasgow.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis dramatically reaffi rmed that financial instability can induce
macroeconomic instability. Similar experience in the past led some to recommend
partitioning financial intermediaries into safer and riskier entities and adjusting regulatory
practice appropriately. Some proposals were quite radical, but policymakers over time
appeared largely to step back from wide-ranging structural reforms. Following the recent
crisis, restructuring policies are again being introduced or considered1. This paper asks:
Should we break up banks?
Specifically, we consider vertical integration between risky investment and retail banks.
We call ‘investment banking’ the downstream part of financial intermediation which
directly finances risky entrepreneurs by purchase of their equities. The investment banks
fund their equity stake by borrowing from retail banks. Retail banks, the safer part of
financial intermediation, are funded by private agents’deposits. Initially the problems
facing the retail banks and the investment banks are set out separately; these institutions
are then ‘merged’to model universal banking. The model also incorporates protection for
retail depositors similar to aspects of the Glass-Steagall Act and the wider response (e.g.,
deposit insurance) to the Great Depression2. There are few macroeconomic models in the
literature appropriate for assessing such structural reforms. This paper is an attempt to
begin filling that gap.
The model has three distinctive features. First, investment banks, having leveraged
equity stakes in intermediate goods producers, have projects with uncertain returns. They
choose the expected profit maximizing level of borrowing before demand conditions are
known, so determining the likelihood of their defaulting. Second, retail and investment
banks have monopolistic pricing power and enjoy a form of limited liability. Although
harvesting assets of a failed bank is costly, that bank continues trading next period without
carrying over the loss. An alternative description is that the bank goes bust and is replaced
next period so that market structure is identical period-to-period. In any case, limited
liability makes banks more risky by narrowing credit spreads, whilst monopoly power
widens spreads.
1In Europe the Liikanen proposals appear to have stalled. In the UK, the Vickers ringfence has been
introduced and in the US there is the so-called Volcker Rule.
2Other dimension of the Glass-Steagall Act are discussed in Boot and Thakor (1997), who consider a
merger between equity underwriting and loan provision leaving deposit holding issues to one side. Those
services are substitutable and so their focus is more on a horizontal type of merger. The result is intuitive:
horizontal integration reduces the size of financial services.
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Finally, there is a rich menu of shocks. Investment and universal banks face
idiosyncratic and common shocks. Retail banks can diversify idiosyncratic risk. Merging
retail banks with investment banks puts depositors’funds at greater risk. Hence, depending
on the size of common and idiosyncratic shocks and whether or not banks are universal,
the economy is relatively well-insured against, or vulnerable to, financial shocks.
Key findings: The main disadvantage of separated banking compared with universal
banking is higher borrowing costs for firms. That reflects the retail bank spread (mark-up),
in turn the net effect of monopolistic power, limited liability and a risk premium.3 The
main benefit of separated banking is fewer calls for government bailout of retail banks:
Retail banks are diversified and profitable so the probability and size of default are lower
than universal banks’. Bailouts mean government incurs deposit insurance and resolution
costs,4 plus an excess cost of those actions. Increased bailouts are the main disadvantage
of universal banking5 but these are set against its main advantages; higher lending, as
the retail spread is eradicated, and higher average output and consumption. So the
attractiveness of universal banking depends importantly on the effi ciency of government in
bank resolution: the more effi cient is government, the more attractive is universal banking.
The calibrated model shows limited liability is usually a minor determinant of bank
spreads compared to monopoly power. So, along with banking structure, we consider
regulatory policies covering bank profits/mark-ups (the only source of own funds in the
model). Compared with competitive equilibria, optimal regulation further limits bailouts
via higher own funds for universal and investment banks, along with strict anti-trust of
retail banks.
1.1 Related literature
The benefits of universal banks have been of interest to economists for some time. A recent
review by Barth et al. (2000) considers the possible economic consequences of the repeal
of the Glass-Steagall Act. Among the benefits of universal banks are a possible increase in
products and services and a reduction in bank marginal costs. However, it also notes that
a wider range of activities might increase insolvency risk. In a similar vein, Krainer (2000)
argues that universal banks provide operational and informational effi ciencies. On the
other hand, there are concerns that larger banks entail elevated default risk and threaten
3Spengler (1950) showed vertical integration reduces ineffi ciency as it eliminates double marginalization.
See also Benston (1994).
4See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Townsend (1979) first introduced the idea of costly state verification.
5That result chimes with Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998) who show that universal banking requires a
larger FDIC.
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the deposit safety net. Thus, Boyd, Chang and Smith (1998) and Boot and Thakor (1997)
suggest that universal banking requires a larger FDIC.
Nevertheless, to our knowledge, there are no DSGE-based investigations of the optimal
structure of financial intermediaries in the presence of defaults and bailouts. Perhaps the
closest to ours are papers by Gertler, Kiyotaki and Prestipino (2016a, 2016b).6 These
papers study the distinctive role of wholesale/shadow banks when bank runs may cause a
default. Two remedial policies are investigated. The first is the lender of last resort. We
also incorporate costly deposit insurance. That policy in our model positively affects labour
supply and production, but reduces consumption as government intervention is costly.
Gertler et al. (2016a) also consider a leverage constraint. We also look at regulations
making banks more liable for losses. Such policies improve financial stability, reduce costly
government intervention, but restrict lending. The overall focus of these papers is, however,
rather different as they do not consider the optimal structure of financial intermediation.
Finally, we emphasize that evaluation of financial structure is only possible in a general
equilibrium model such as ours. That is because one needs to analyze the costs and
benefits of increasing risk. Higher risk entails greater credit availability and larger output,
affecting prices, interest rates and risk premia. However, elevated risk means banking
is more fragile imposing a bigger burden on public finances when deposit insurance and
resolution are taxpayer-funded. Hence, one needs to drill down into the elements of the
core trade-off– that between higher lending and the costs of bailouts.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 presents the model with separated banking,
studying the behavior of private agents, final goods producers and the optimal default
decisions of investment and retail banks. Section 3 derives the planning solution and
the various wedges of ineffi ciency in the decentralized equilibria. Section 4 analyzes
universal banking. Section 5 provides quantitative analysis and welfare comparisons
between universal and separated banking systems including an analysis of optimal own
funds requirements. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. Appendices contain extensions
to the basic model, additional calculations, derivations and proofs referred to in the text.
2 Overview of the model
The economy consists of continua of households, risk-neutral, monopolistically competitive
banks with limited liability, intermediate and final goods producers. Initially we assume
6We mention later important contributions by Begenau (2016), Begenau and Landvoigt (2016) and
Davydiuk (2017) in particular contexts.
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separate investment and retail banks. Households consume final goods, provide labour
to intermediate firms and deposit savings in retail banks. Retail banks lend to each
investment bank, thus diversifying risks. Each investment bank buys the equity of a
single intermediate good firm making hiring decisions before productivity and demand
are observed.7 And because of idiosyncratic shocks, investment banks have differing rates
of profitability. Some may fail and it is costly to resolve them. When default is not
too widespread retail banks can handle resolution. If it is more extensive, the retail
banks may fail, and the government bails out the retail banks if possible.8 Due to the
underlying (monopoly, resolution and limited liability) frictions, agents’decisions imply
wedges between private and social marginal costs and benefits. Ultimately, the interaction
of those wedges determines the optimal structure of financial intermediaries. We summarize
these in Section 3.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households who evaluate their utility, which depends on




βt (U(Ct, Nt)) ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (U(Ct)− V (Nt)) . (1)
In period t, agents have to decide how much of their current wealth to place in retail banks,
Dt, given Wt, the wage in period t, the expected return on deposits, corporate profits, Πt,
and lump sum tax, Tt. The household’s budget constraint is
Ct +Dt = R
h
t−1ΓtDt−1 +WtNt + Πt − Tt. (2)
Between date t− 1 and the start of t deposit balances earn a nominal gross interest return
of ΓtRht−1, where R
h
t−1 is the gross interest each bank agrees to pay ex ante. However,
the ex-post return may be smaller if banks’assets at the end of the period are lower than
Rht−1Dt−1. In that case banks will pay only a proportion Γ
B
t of their obligations. If there
is deposit insurance then ΓGt is provided by the government. Therefore the proportion of
the contracted return actually received by the depositors is Γt = ΓGt + Γ
B
t . There exists the
possibility that the banks’assets are so low that the government may not wish, or have the
capacity, to bail out in full the depository institutions. The Γt reflects these eventualities,
7That assumption is similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); what we call the intermediate firm, they
call the entrepreneur. Thus, as equity holder, the bank determines the employment and degree of risk
taking. The investment bank is de facto the intermediate firm. See below.
8The government resolves failing banks and repays deposits subject to any fiscal limit. Note, deposit
insurance will subsidize borrowing costs of financial intermediaries. See Faria-e-Castro (2017). When there
are only universal banks, government resolves those. See discussion below.
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hence it is stochastic and Γt ≤ 1. Thus Γt is an equilibrium object which depends on the
structure of the banking sector, government deposit protection policy and the confluence
of shocks observed in each time period.
Necessary conditions for an optimum include a labour supply equation and the Euler
equation for savings:









2.2 The final goods sector
The production technology for final goods, common to all producers, is
Yt = AtXt, (4)
where Xt is an intermediate input. At may be thought of as an aggregate macro shock to




where 0 < ρ < 1 and ut+1 is a shock with ut+1 ≥ 0 and Etut+1 = 1. The cumulative
distribution and density of ut+1 are denoted F ut (ut+1) and f
u
t (ut+1) respectively, and are
known at time t.
The production cost is Qt
At
Yt, where Qt is the real price of output of the intermediate
sector. We assume the final goods sector is imperfectly competitive. It is straightforward






; Xt = Yt/At. (6)
µFt > 1 is the monopolistic mark-up in final good production.
2.3 Banks
In a separated system there are two types of banks, an investment bank and a retail
bank. The output of investment banks comprises a bundle of intermediate goods and
services demanded by the final goods producers. Investment banks finance their activities
by borrowing funds from retail banks. The only role for retail banks is to collect deposits
from households and channel funds to investment banks. In this loan market they are
monopolistic competitors. When investment and retail bank are vertically integrated into
a universal bank, there is no role for such a loan market. We analyze this latter case in
Section 4. The banking sector problems are now set out in detail.
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2.4 The investment bank
Recall, that agents deposit savings in retail banks. The retail banks bundle and sell these
funds to an investment banking sector. Each investment bank buys the entire equity of a
single intermediate goods producer.9 The funds so invested and borrowed from the retail
sector, pay an intermediate good producer’s wage bill ahead of selling their output to
the final good sector. One may think of the investment bank and the intermediate good
producer as one and the same entity, which we do from here on.
Our investment banks are rather like risky entrepreneurs in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), banks own
a business which generates risky profits. Unlike them, however, we allow business risk to
be suffi ciently high that default on deposit liabilities is a real possibility. If output is below
some value banks will default, having negative net assets. If these losses in aggregate are
large, retail banks in turn cannot repay depositors in full. The banks’losses may be made
good in part, or in whole, by the taxpayer. If output is high enough, profit is remitted to
private agents.
An investment bank/intermediate firm produces output at t+1, Xt+1(j), by employing
labour at time t. Labour is homogeneous and is used with the following linear production
technology to which all banks have access:
Xt+1(j) = et+1(j)Nt(j). (7)
Here, Nt(j) is the labour input employed by investment bank j, and et+1(j) is a j−specific
shock10. It is assumed that et+1(j) ≥ 0, and Etet+1(j) = 1. The cumulative distribution
and density of et+1, F et (et+1) and f
e
t (et+1) respectively, are known at time t and common
to all banks.11
At the start of period t the investment bank borrows amount Bt(j) = WtNt(j) from
retail banks. In the next period the investment bank receivesQt+1(j)Xt+1(j), and promises,
9The model does not qualitatively change if some degree of risk diversification is incorporated. However
the volatility of the non-diversified idiosyncratic risk is important for the quantitative results.
10Equation (7) is actually consistent with a somewhat richer menu of shocks. In the working paper
version (Damjanovic et al., 2016) of this paper we considered a more general production technology for
the bank, including a common level of banking sector factor productivity, Ωt, and a common, sector-wide
shock, ubankt+1 . Hence (7) above was replaced by Xt+1(j) = Ωtu
bank
t+1 et+1(j)Nt(j). However, in the model
they are indistinguishable in their effects from final sector TFP, At, and the macro shock ut+1. So without
loss of generality we here work with (7).
11An implication therefore of this timing assumption is that time t aggregate output is effectively
produced by lagged (t − 1) labour. This timing assumption has been used in a number of environments
and with empirical support. See, for example, Burnside et al. (1993), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996),
Belo et al. (2014), and Madeira, (2014, 2018). Moreover, as we show in Appendix E, our model responds
to a productivity shock in a familiar way.
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if possible, to pay Bt(j)Rct to the retail bank, where Qt+1(j) is price per unit of Xt+1(j),
and Rct is interest on the loan.
The market for the output of the investment banking sector is assumed to be
monopolistically competitive. The total demand for that output– one may wish to think







η−1 , where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution (or the degree of














The aggregate price next period, Qt+1, and corresponding aggregate demand, Xt+1, are
exogenous to the jth bank’s decision. The ex-post price depends on the realization of bank













Next period’s economy-wide demand, Xt+1, and price, Qt+1, are unknown and depend on
the future final good sector shock, ut+1, as we explain further below.
2.4.1 Default decision of investment banks
A key step in the analysis is characterizing the optimal behavior of the investment bank.
Ex-ante, the investment bank needs to decide on the level of borrowing/labour input.
Suppose that investment banks have a form of limited liability with profit bounded below
at zero. If banks are risk-neutral, expected profit is
















Formula (10) shows that profit depends on employment, Nt(j), chosen ex-ante, and the
realisation of the combined shock st(j) := [et+1(j)]1−1/η ut+1. For any level of employment,










which sets ex-post profit to zero. Thus, limited liability means that banks maximize profits
on a subset of states of nature. They choose a level of borrowing which implies, in effect,
a cut-off value for a composite of the shocks facing banks, below which default occurs.
That is, given production, the bank will default, Πt+1(j) < 0, if and only if the combined
productivity shock is smaller than a threshold level:
[et+1(j)]
1−1/η ut+1 < εDt(j). (12)
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That threshold, εDt(j), and therefore the probability of default, increases with Nt(j) other
things constant; the more labour hired, the larger the loan from retail banks and the
more vulnerable to low (idiosyncratic and systemic) productivity is the jth investment
bank’s ability to repay. This indicates a key trade-off to be developed more fully later:
Higher borrowing boosts the supply of financial intermediation and production, but
may compromise financial stability, implying higher resolution costs and lower aggregate
consumption.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all j firms employ the same labour and choose the same
default threshold, εDt. The investment bank mark-up, µIBt , is defined as the ratio of
expected revenue to total costs. From definition (11) the mark-up, µIBt , which is the net











In short, in a symmetric equilibrium (and dropping the j subscript) εDt depends on:
competitiveness, η– less intense competition reduces εDt; limited liability which increases
εDt (since εDt is defined such that the bank will default, EtΠt+1 < 0); and the distribution12
of shocks, st+1 = [et+1]1−1/η ut+1. Appendix A Section 7.1 studies the investment bank’s
optimization problem in detail.
2.5 The retail bank
The solution to the retail bank’s problem is similar in structure to the investment bank’s:
it involves a markup and an optimal probability of default. Unlike the investment bank
which faces idiosyncratic risk, each retail bank diversifies its risks by investing in each of
the investment banks. To solve a retail bank’s profit maximization problem, one needs to
calculate likely loan losses, and attendant resolution costs, on its portfolio of investment
bank loans. This is what we do in this section. There is a continuum of risk-neutral retail
banks indexed by i. Banks pay gross interest Rht on deposits if possible. That deposit rate
will be common across banks and need not be indexed by i. In the loans market, banks
are monopolistic competitors and set loan rates, Rct(i). So, following Aksoy et al. (2012),































is the aggregate of idiosyncratic shocks across investment
banks.
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δ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between loans. The objective of each bank, therefore,
is to maximize expected profits by choosing the rate charged on lending. If all borrowers
remain solvent, the retail bank will earn Rct per unit loaned. In the case of default, the
assets of the borrower are repossessed by the retail bank at a cost.
The profits of the individual retail bank are ultimately determined by outturns in
the investment banking sector. In some states, an investment bank may not be able to
repay its loan in full and such value as remains is recovered only at additional cost. As
shown in Appendix B, the average recovery rate on loans to the investment banking sector,
ΓIB(ut+1), depends on the common shock, ut+1, the investment banks’default threshold





















Every bank with an idiosyncratic shock lower than eD (ut+1), reflected in the first term on
the right hand side of (15), will be in default to a greater or lesser extent; those for whom
et+1(j) ≥ eD (ut+1), reflected in the second term, will be able to meet their commitments
in full. It is interesting to note that the conditional probability of default depends on the
distribution of the cross-sectional idiosyncratic shock, f e, as emphasized by Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2014), in addition to the volatility of the common shock, ut+1, as in
Bloom (2009). We consider uncertainty-type shocks in Section 5 as they can be important
in the welfare assessment of different banking structures.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), resolution costs, MBi (ut+1), are proportional
to repossessed assets and so they also depend on the systemic shock,
MBi (ut+1) = τω(ut+1)R
c
t(i)Bt(i). (17)
Here τ measures the effi ciency of the retail bank in dealing with default, the larger is τ the
more costly is the resolution of delinquent loans. The function ω(ut+1) is the average ratio








So, given these preliminaries, retail banks maximize expected profit, EtΨt+1, given the
demand for loans, (14), anticipating the impact of non-performing loans and knowing that
their liabilities are limited:
EtΨt+1(R
c
t(i)) = Et max(Γ
IB(ut+1)R
c
t(i)Bt(i)−RhtBt(i)−MBi , 0). (18)






≡ µRBt and cut-off
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value for the common shock, yt, below which the banks default (i.e., if ut+1 < yt). So retail
banks are all either solvent or insolvent.
As demonstrated in Appendix B, the more profitable are banks, the lower is the
probability of default. Moreover, the recovery rate weakly increases in the credit spread.
Intuitively, profit maximization implies that the spread, µRBt , is inversely related to the




Clearly, the spread takes account of likely loan losses (the first term in this latter expression)
and resolution cost (the second term). Both are a function of the default threshold yt
which, in a symmetric equilibrium, depends on the distribution of the common shock,
ut+1, competitiveness in retail banking, δ, planned default of the investment bank, εDt,
and resolution effi ciency τ which we discuss further below. The recovery rate of deposits










implying that the recovery rate, ΓRB(ut+1), weakly increases in the credit spread.
However, for households, the total recovery rate of deposits (and economy-wide
monitoring costs) depends both on retail banks’but also government’s intervention. This
is considered next.
2.6 Deposit insurance
Deposit insurance aims to make good on bank losses that would otherwise harm retail
customers. Since ΓRB(ut+1) is the proportion of deposit liabilities that the retail banks
can cover, the per deposit call on the deposit insurance scheme is 1− ΓRB(ut+1) ≥ 0. Let
Gt be the size of government intervention with fiscal limit, Gt ≤ syYt, sy ⊂ (0, 1). Then,






















is the share of deposits paid by government.
The first term after the min operator acknowledges that full deposit insurance may
not be feasible. So, the total proportion of deposits redeemed is: Γ(ut+1) = ΓG(ut+1) +
ΓRB(ut+1)which increases with the spread, µRBt .
13 That captures the trade-off associated
with retail banking: A higher spread reduces effi ciency as loans are more costly, but deposits
are safer and costly government intervention less likely.
13See Appendix B, Propositions 12-14.
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2.7 Resolution costs and the aggregate costs of financial distress
Besides the resolution costs incurred by retail banks when investment banks default– see




t−1, if ut < yt−1, and M
G(ut) = 0, if ut > yt−1.
Here τ g indexes government resolution effi ciency, just as τ did for retail banks. Therefore,
total resolution costs in the event of bank insolvency are Mt = MBt +MGt .
As noted, the size of the government bailout is denoted G. Government intervention
is assumed costly, denoted here by g(Gt)14. For tractability, we assume g is linear in G.
Thus, the economy’s resource constraint is
Yt = Ct + gGt +Mt, g ≥ 0. (21)








The precise forms of ξ(·) change with banking structure and are derived in Appendix C15.
3 Effi ciency, welfare and financial structure
Ineffi ciency in the model stems from two sources. First, ξ(ut) shows that consumption
is smaller per unit of labour due to resolution and deposit insurance costs. Second,
equilibrium labour reflects various wedges, themselves functions of monopoly, resolution
and limited liability frictions. In the next few sections we summarize these factors, indicate
how they differ in a model of the universal bank and analyze when certain frictions are
more significant.
3.1 The planning and decentralized equilibria







βt (U(Ct)− V (Nt)) . (23)
Ct and Nt are consumption and labour at period t respectively, and β < 1 is the time
discount factor. We adopt standard conventions that Uc(Ct) > 0, Ucc(Ct) < 0; Vn(Nt) > 0,
14Such costs are generally associated with distortive taxation.
15We also report the full model equations in Appendix C where we discuss further the solution procedure
and equilibrium of the model and where ξ(.) is defined in formulae (62) and (64).
12
Vnn(Nt) > 0. The feasibility constraint is imposed by the aggregate production technology,
Yt = F (Nt−1), where FN (Nt−1) > 0 and Ct = Yt. The optimal choice of the planner ensures
that
βEt [Uc(Yt+1)FN (Nt)] = VN (Nt).
The decentralized equilibrium results in a suboptimal outcome:
βEt [Uc(Yt+1)FN (Nt)] = µt × VN (Nt) (24)
where µt is an aggregate wedge of ineffi ciency:
µt = µ
F
t × µIBt × µRBt × µHt × µY Ct . (25)
Here µFt > 1 is the monopolistic pricing mark-up of final goods. The wedges of investment
banks and retail banks, µIBt and µ
RB
t respectively, reflect limited liability, monopolistic
pricing and risk premia. A household wedge µHt will arise as households do not internalize
positive externalities between their labour supply and savings decisions and aggregate
production, and because there is an impact on labour supply from deposit insurance;
deposit insurance ceteris paribus encourages households to supply labour. Finally, µY Ct
is due to the difference between output and consumption because of costly government
intervention and bank resolution. After deriving these wedges, we discuss the effect that
different financial structures have on those wedges.
3.2 The investment bank wedge µIBt and financial stability
Investment banks enjoy monopolistic power and limited liability. These affect the spread
in opposite directions with the first depressing, and the second boosting, lending. In the
calibration below, monopoly power is typically much more significant. The probability
of default positively depends on the default threshold, εDt, and so a higher εDt reduces
financial stability. But since µIBt = ∆
1−1/η
t /εDt, a higher εDt also boosts effi ciency
suggesting a (partial equilibrium) trade-offbetween financial stability and effi ciency. It also
suggests that prudential regulations may be welfare enhancing. One natural suggestion is
to rescind, in full or in part, limited liability (see the final section of Appendix A). Another
is to impose capital (own funds) requirements (see Tables 2 and 5 below).
3.3 The retail bank wedge: µRBt
The mark-up in retail banking reflects monopoly (quantitatively the most significant
component in the baseline calibration), limited liability (a minor effect in the baseline given
banks’diversification) and a risk premium (to cover ‘pure risk’plus resolution costs). A
13




t , improves financial stability, absorbing investment bank







δ − 1 × µ
RB1






> 1 represents the pure risk premium. The second term







> 1. Both the risk
premium, µRB1t , and the resolution cost premium µ
RB2
t , increase in investment bank
riskiness. Thus, a larger investment bank mark-up increases the recovery rate in the
retail bank sector.17 To the extent that monopoly is the most significant determinant of
the mark-up and retail banks are well-diversified, a possible effective reform is to boost




< 0 (see Appendix B) and
reduces investment banks’cost of funds. The economy expands but becomes a little more
fragile.18 We pursue the issue of joint regulation of investment and retail banks below.
3.4 The household wedge: µHt
In Appendix D we show the household wedge is the product of two wedges, µHt =
µHNt × µHDt , where
µHNt :=
Et [Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt, ut+1)]





The first wedge µHNt arises as household does not internalize the correlation between labour
productivity and future marginal utility of consumption. That correlation is negative19 so
µHNt < 1. The second wedge, µ
HD
t , reflects lower labour supply due to uncertainty of
savings, so µHDt > 1; this wedge declines in deposit insurance. Alternatively µ
HD
t reflects
16So, one may view the breaking up of universal banks akin to an increased capital requirement.
17This is intuitive, but is proved in deriving equation (59) in the appendix.
18Results available on request show that even in a model with only idiosyncratic shocks and a perfectly
competitive retail bank sector one faces a similar trade-off to the main model presented here: production
effi ciency vs. costly bailout. If monitoring effi ciency is the same across the public and private sectors,
the universal system has the benefit of larger production without imposing excess costs associated with
deposit insurance. The larger the cost of deposit insurance, g, the smaller is the relative benefit of universal
banking.
19The productivity of labour increases with larger values of the shock ut+1, as well as consumption.
Since marginal utility declines with consumption, one can deduce that covt [Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt)] < 0, and
therefore µHN − 1 = covt[Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt)]EtFN (Nt)Et[Uc(Ct+1)] < 0.
14
deposit uncertainty and is a measure of savings risk. From Euler equation (3) one recovers
an additional risk premium
βRht =
Uc (Ct)




× µHDt . (28)
Thus, µHDt measures the difference between the actual deposit rate and what it would have
been absent risk.
3.5 The precautionary labour supply: µY Ct




µHt ×µFt ×µIBt ×µRBt
.
µY Ct =
Et [Uc(Yt+1)FN (Nt, ut+1)]
Et [Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt, ut+1)]
. (29)
Since marginal utility is a decreasing function, Uc(Yt+1) < Uc(Ct+1), this wedge is less
than one, µY Ct < 1. That reflects a “precautionary supply of labour”. Ceteris paribus,
the wedge is smaller when the costs of default are larger (i.e., government intervention
plus private resolution). Deposit insurance and bank resolution costs induce higher labour
supply (and output). Higher default costs drive a larger wedge between Yt+1 and Ct+1, and
therefore between Uc(Yt+1) and Uc(Ct+1), producing a smaller µY Ct . Note, deposit insurance
increases labour through the precautionary channel µY Ct as well as via deposit certainty, µ
H
t ,
both declining in the size of government deposit protection, ΓG(ut+1). Specifically, deposit
insurance boosts the supply of labour and deposits as it stabilizes the return to savings; by
implication the return to working is more certain. Second, government spending and its
excess burden depress Ct+1, increasing the precautionary supply. When default rates are
low, the quantitative impact of deposit protection on labour supply is modest. However,
as the next two sections show, the quantitative impact of resolution costs can be much
more significant.
4 The costs and benefits of universal banking
So far we have discussed the case of separate retail and investment banks. By merging
a retail bank with an investment bank we construct a simple universal bank. We
show that universal banking, ceteris paribus, improves effi ciency; it boosts lending and
employment and reduces the labour market deadweight loss. Eliminating the µRBt mark-
up under universal banking, reduces loss-absorbing own funds and the cost of government
intervention is greater. That, of course, impacts negatively consumption, as the previous
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section showed. Typically, then, the main trade-off is between higher lending and
production but more costly resolution under universal banking, versus a smaller, more
stable economy with separated banking. These features of universal banks are now
developed.
There is a continuum of universal banks as, loosely speaking, each retail bank is
merged with one investment bank, into one monopolistically competitive business. This
universal bank has the same market power as the investment bank20. The universal bank












t = 1. As Spengler (1950) noted, the generic benefit of
vertical integration is the elimination of a vertical margin.
The default threshold for the universal bank is, for now, the same as for the investment
bank, whilst all the monitoring/resolution costs are now borne by the government:




The share of deposits recoverable from the universal bank is the same as under investment
banking, ΓUB(ut+1) = ΓIB(ut+1) as defined in (15). And so the size of government












Combining (30) and (31) we recall ξU(ut) indexes the output costs of financial distress for
universal banking at time t,
ξU (ut) =





τ gω (ut) + gmin
(




ut × µFt × µIBt
. (32)
The numerator reflects the previous two equations: resolution costs plus the costs of deposit
insurance. The denominator shows that larger final goods and banking mark-ups and more
favorable shocks reduce financial distress.
Finally, under universal banking the deposits recovery rate is given by. ΓU (ut) =
min
(
sy × ut × µFt × µIBt + ΓIB(ut); 1
)
).
4.1 The output costs of financial distress
One can now assess the cost of defaults under universal banking by comparing resolution
costs of failed universal banks with a situation where, had separate retail banks existed,
the aggregate shock would not have caused retail bank failures:
20We relax that assumption in Section 5.
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Proposition 1 If the common shock is such that retail banks would have been solvent,
ut > yt−1, and where τ < τ g×µRBt , the relative costs from bank resolution are larger under
universal banking.
Proof. We wish to show that ξU(ut) > ξ(ut). When retail banks are solvent, the only




. However, universal banking incurs both monitoring and deposit
insurance costs. Under universal banking, the monitoring cost alone is larger if τ g > τ/µRBt .
It is worth noting that, although rare, when retail banks are in default, ut < yt−1,
the total costs of resolution may be larger under separated banking. That is because
government incurs additional costs associated with retail banks’resolution. Nevertheless,
on average, financial distress costs are larger with universal banking, ξU(ut) > ξ(ut).
4.2 The benefits from a larger supply of loans
The benefits of universal banking flow from more lending, higher demand for labour and
increased output. Figure 1 represents the source of the benefit of universal banks.
Figure 1. Eliminating the credit spread
The spread under separated banking creates a deadweight loss which is eliminated
under universal banking. In addition, there is a change in loan supply which depends on
two principal factors pulling in different directions. The first is the safety of deposits. If
deposits are risky (say deposit insurance is incomplete and the economy is volatile), then
since ΓU < Γ, the supply of loans will be lower. However, in our baseline calibration, the
risk attached to deposits is negligible. The second is precautionary savings. As resolution
costs are typically larger under universal banking, ξU(ut) > ξ(ut), so is marginal utility,
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UC(1 − ξU(ut)) > UC(1 − ξ(ut)). The effect of precautionary savings is also small but
quantitatively more significant and it increases the supply of loans. Therefore, the increase
in loan supply under universal banking is due to two effects: the first is from narrowing in
the spread and the second from a precautionary increase in savings.
5 Welfare comparison of universal and separated
banking
The core trade-off in the model, then, is this. Lower mark-ups boost activity but the
clean-up costs of financial fragility rise. This section presents a numerical version of the
model to better understand how the frictions (monopoly, limited liability and resolution)
interact and drive that trade-off.
5.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated primarily on credit spreads and default rates. For the baseline,
η = 7, δ = 41 and σu = 0.029, σε = 0.095, where shock are lognormally distributed with
the expected value of one. Those assumptions imply a default rate for investment banks
of 5.0%, and for retail banks of 0.5%. So, retail banks fail on average once in 200 years,
investment banks once in 20 years. This is perhaps more conservative than Boissay et
al. (2016) who assume bank failures every 40 years21. On the other hand, Gertler and
Karadi (2011) assume the lifespan of a bank to be 10 years. We experiment below with
parameterizations implying higher default than baseline and optimal profitability (own
fund) requirements which imply lower default.
Competitiveness in retail banking, δ = 41, implies a spread of around 3.3% similar to
the average return on a BBA-rated corporate bond. That calibration is broadly consistent
with a number of empirical studies. Adrian et al. (2014) suggest loan and bond spreads are
volatile varying from 1.5% to 4.5% over the business cycle. Boissay et al. (2016) estimate
the spread between the real corporate loan rate and the implicit real risk-free rate is 1.7%.
Gertler et al. (2016) estimate the spread between the deposit rate and retail bankers’
returns on loans to be 1.2% annually in steady state. According to Corbae, and D’Erasmo
(2019) the interest margin in USA commercial banking is 4.6%. Our parameterization
21Their data is from Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2013) who focus on 14 now-advanced countries over
the period 1870-2008. On the other hand, Laeven and Valencia (2013) identify 147 banking crises over
the period 1970—2011 for both advanced and developing economies. However, very few of those are of the
severity of 1929-33 or 2007/8.
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implies 2.5 percentage points is monopolistic power and 0.8 percentage point is the net
effect of limited liability and risk premia. Gerali et al. (2010) estimate that monopolistic
power of the banks in loans to households is about 2.75%, and in loans to enterprises about
3.12%.
Calibrating the mark-up in investment and universal banking is challenging. One may
consider the mark-up, the Lerner index or the net profit margin as possible benchmarks.
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2019) for the US show mark-ups exceed 50% and the Lerner Index
exceeds 30%. Net profit margins at European banks are volatile with average profitability
of 5.9%. However, excluding banks with profitability lower than −100% or greater than
100%, the average is 20%. Moreover, excluding banks with assets below $1bn, the average
is 11% and the asset-weighted average is 16%. The Lerner index in the Euro area averages
18% between 1996 and 2007, although it reached 30% in 2015. In Germany it is much
lower, 6% on average (sample 1996 to 2013).22Assuming η = 7, as we do, the investment
bank mark-up is about 15.7% (µIBt = 1.157).
Chirinko and Fazzari (2000) estimate the average Lerner index across different
industries between 3% and 10% with an average value of 6%. So we fix µFt = 1.06.
The time discount factor is β = 0.95.
Deposit insurance is limited to 10% of GDP (sy = 0.1)23, and the excess cost of fund-
raising is 20% (g = 0.2). That is consistent with Allgood et al. (1998). The retail bank’s
cost of resolution is τ = 0.125 (see Nolan and Thoenissen, 2009)24. Government is assumed
less effi cient, τ g = 0.15.25
5.2 The welfare of banking structures





measured in consumption equivalent (CE) units26. We also report welfare ex post, that is
following a particular shock. The ex post probability of separated banking being preferred
is denoted Pr(USB > UUB); this indicates how likely is universal banking to be welfare
22These calculations are based on data from TheBankerDatabase.com.
23Simulations indicate that with such a restriction, deposit insurance comes up short only very rarely,
in fact with probability about 10−10.
24They follow Bernanke et al. (1999). Christiano at al. (2010) estimated the parameter to be 0.25. If
we doubled the cost, it would be necessary to reduce the volatility of the common shock in order to match
the spread and the default rate in retail banking.
25Assuming that the government is slightly less effi cient is consistent with La Porta et al. (2002).
Without this assumption, the universal banking structure is almost always prefered to separated banking.
See below.





(1− κ)−1 C1−κt − λ(1 + v)−1N1+vt
)
. We set κ = 0.8; λ = 1; v = 2.
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inferior compared to separated banking, or how likely policymakers will regret adopting
universal banking structures; in short, it may inform on the sustainability of structures.
Our baseline results are in Table 1. On average, universal banking is welfare superior by
about 0.2% in consumption equivalents. Universal banking is also preferred to separated

















Universal 0.914 0.907 0.992 0.63% 1.17 1 0.959 0.9949





= 0.2%; Pr(USB > UUB)= 9.1%.
Notes: µIBt = 1.157; µt= µ
F×µIBt ×µRBt ×µHt ×µY Ct ; spread = µRBt .
IB = investment bank, RB = retail bank, UB = universal bank SB = separated banks
Table 1 decomposes the aggregate mark-up µt into constituent wedges. The aggregate
wedge in separated banking at 20% is larger than universal banking, 17%, principally due




t ), ceteris paribus,
may partly offset bank mark-ups. As shown in Section 3, µHt reflects two sub-wedges: one
a ‘deficiency’of labour supply due to deposit uncertainty and offset by deposit insurance,
is almost zero (µHDt ≈ 1)27. The other is an ‘excess’of labour caused by households not
internalizing the negative correlation between productivity and marginal utility. In the
benchmark case, that also is small. Finally, µY Ct captures the precautionary element in
labour supply to maintain consumption in the event of costly government intervention.
Taken together the household wedges are small in comparison with bank mark-ups (again
mainly because retail bank default is infrequent).
The costs of resolution and deposit protection as a proportion of output are
(Yt − Ct) /Yt = (Mt + gGt) /Yt ≡ ξ(ut). These costs, on average, are larger under universal
banking (0.63% compared with 0.56% under separated banking) but are offset by higher
lending and aggregate output due to the elimination of the spread.
Table 1 thus provides a first pass at evaluating the core trade-offbetween a lower mark-
up with higher resolution costs under universal banking, and the opposite under separate
banking. The monopoly-driven distortions are key: In the base case, higher resolution
27µHDt is very close to unity because in the baseline, recovery rates Γ and Γ
U are almost always equal
to 1.
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costs and extra borrowing (and therefore labour) are more than offset by higher output





One reason to overturn that welfare assessment might be following a negative systemic
shock, ut, when resolution costs are temporarily very high, driving consumption sharply
lower. In that case, agents might have preferred separated banks and the extra cushion
of profits. However, the likelihood of such a shock occurring is relatively small, Pr(USB >
UUB) = 9.1%.28
The investment bank mark-up, 15.7%, largely reflects the impact of monopoly power:
µIBmonopoly =
1
η−1 = 16.7%. Limited liability thus reduces the mark-up by one percentage
point, improving effi ciency but compromising financial stability.29 Table 2 reports the
wider impact of limited liability. We simulate the model with µIBt = 16.7% and similarly
assume that retail banks face unlimited liability.30 Unlimited liability here means that
the bank maximizes expected profit accounting for all possible losses. Although banks
internalize losses in all states of the world, they can still fail if the return on their assets is
not suffi cient to cover their borrowings.
The probability of investment bank failure, Pr(IB default), falls from once in every
twenty years (the baseline in Table 1) to once in every twenty-five years. For retail banks,
the probability of default Pr(RB default), falls to once in four hundred years. This more





The retail bank spread falls slightly, as investment banks are safer. Table 2 also indicates
a gain in consumption equivalent (Gain in CE) in moving to unlimited liability. That
suggests a role for welfare-improving capital requirements which we pursue in Section 5.6.
The model calibration can be changed in many ways to further analyze welfare. We
present those we think more significant. First, we look at the effi ciency of government
intervention, g and τ g. Next, we turn to permanent and temporary changes in idiosyncratic
and systemic volatility. Finally, we calculate optimal capital requirements in the form of
a target for profitability (own funds).
28Moreover, for very bad shocks, those with probability of less that 1%, (F (u) ≤ 1%) one finds that
universal banks are once gain preferred. That is because monitoring costs, which are proportional to assets
and not the short fall in own funds, jump from zero to a value proportional to retail bank sector assets.
Appendix E has some details.
29See Appendix A, Section 7.2, for the analysis of the model when we relax the assumption of limited
liability and replace it with a regulation that requires the banks to maintain a certain level of profitability.
30The spread is defined by formula (26) with the planned default threshold set to zero, y = 0.
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Table 2: Effect of Limited liability
Separated Baseline Unlimited liability
banking
Pr(IB default) 5.0% 4.05%
Pr(RB default) 0.5% 0.25%
µIBt 15.7% 16.7%













Gain in CE 0.057%
Notes: IB = investment bank,
RB = retail bank, SB = separated bank
5.3 Government effi ciency
Government effi ciency is measured by the marginal costs of its activities in resolution, τ g,
and deposit protection, g. The higher those costs, the greater the impact on consumption
of universal banking defaults.
Column 2 in Table 3 reports the baseline calibration (Table 1). We then increase first
g and then τ g . Note that the probability of default is as per the baseline calibration.
Monopoly mark-ups change imperceptibly compared with Table 1 (so we do not report
them) as there is no direct effect of government intervention on banks’profit maximization.
When the cost of government intervention inceases, (g = 0.6), deposit insurance becomes
relatively more costly under universal banking as there are fewer interventions under
separated banking. The upshot is that the probability that separated banking is preferred
to universal banking increases by 11 percentage points, Pr(UUB < USB) = 21%. It is not
that banks fail any more often in this scenario, it is that failure is more costly. That said,




= 0.16%, but the
welfare gain is smaller than in the baseline model (0.2%).
More strikingly, when τ g increases from 0.15 to 0.25 (Table 3 column 4), the average hit
to consumption from resolution increases from 0.63% to 1.03% under universal banking,
while with separated banking the impact on consumption is much smaller. Not only is
separated banking now preferable on average, but also almost 70% of shocks confirm that
ranking. Thus, when government resolution is ineffi cient (high τ g), it is preferable to
separate banks.
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Table 3. Government effi ciency
Baseline g = 0.6 τg= 0.25 τg= 0.125
Pr (U
UB





















0.56% 0.56% 0.60% 0.55%
Benchmark: g = 0.2; τg = 0.15; τ = 0.125. The spread (µRBt ),
µIBt and default frequencies change < 10−6 compared with
Table 1. Notes: IB = investment bank, RB = retail bank,
UB = universal bank, SB = separated banks
On the other hand, when the government is as effi cient as retail banks (Table 3 column 5,
τ g = 0.125), universal banking is more strongly preferred to separated banking than in the
baseline case, and almost no shock contradicts that judgment, Pr(USB > UUB) < 0.001%.
In truth, we appear to know relatively little about τ g. However, to the extent that
the new bank recovery and resolution procedures introduced following the crisis, and other
innovations such as living wills, act to reduce τ g, our model suggests that they may be
rather significant. Indeed as τ g → τ Table 3 suggests a decisive preference for universal
banks.
5.4 Volatility
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014) argue that shocks to cross-sectional uncertainty
(volatility shocks) help us understand business cycles31. So first Table 4 compares high
and low volatility economies; that is, economies that are identical except that one has
structurally greater volatility. Then below we look at volatility shocks– unanticipated,
transient but persistent, increases in the volatility of systemic (ut) and idiosyncratic (et)
shocks. In both experiments volatility is increased such that the default probability of
investment banks rises one percentage point on the baseline to Pr(IB default) =F (Λ) =
6.0%.32
The first column in Table 4 reports the baseline results of Table 1. The middle column
(Idiosync) reports the effects of structurally higher idiosyncratic uncertainty (systemic
uncertainty held to base). And the final column (Systemic) shows how structurally higher
systemic volatility plays out (idiosyncratic uncertainty held to base).
31See also De Fiore, Teles and Tristani, (2011).
32In other words, an idiosyncratic volatility shock is an innovation to the variance of idiosyncratic
profitability shocks, and a systemic volatility shock is an innovation to the conditional variance of the
aggregate TFP shock.
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Table 4. Volatility change
Baseline Idiosync. Systemic
σε= 0.09518 σε= 0.09959 σε= 0.09518
σu= 0.0278 σu= 0.0278 σu= 0.03745
ENUB 0.91 0.92 0.92
ENSB 0.90 0.91 0.91
Pr (U
UB






Pr(IB default) 5.0% 6.0% 6.0%
Pr(RB default) 0.5% 0.69% 2.9%
spread 3.29% 3.46% 3.38%
µIBt 15.66% 15.44% 15.44%
µSB,t 20.15% 20.00% 19.50%

















Notes: IB = investment bank, RB = retail bank,
UB = universal bank, SB = separated banks.
µX,t, X = U, S: aggregate wedge, banking structure XB.
Higher volatility raises banks’riskiness; banks inhabit a more risky landscape whilst
still enjoying limited liability. Labour supply is higher compared with Table 1 as households
try to absorb the consumption impact of increased resolution costs 33.
With higher idiosyncratic volatility investment banks demand more labour and have
a smaller mark-up as they exploit limited liability a little more compared to baseline.
Because the probability of default and associated resolution costs are also higher than
baseline, the retail spread increases due to higher risk premia. Since resolution costs are
higher when undertaken by government, the same level of default is more costly under
universal banking in a high volatility economy. Higher idiosyncratic volatility results in,
however, only a modest increase in the default rate of retail banks (from 0.50% to 0.69%).
In contrast, when systemic volatility is larger, retail banks increase the spread a little
but exploit much more the limited liability margin. The economy is much more exposed
to the tail risk of retail bank failure and default increases from 0.50% to 2.9%. Retail
bank failure requires government intervention which is all the more costly as investment
banks have also necessarily failed in this scenario. Government intervention is less costly
when only universal banks require resolution, making universal banking more attractive:






= 0.52%, compared to 0.20% at baseline model. In short, systemic
volatility is more damaging than idiosyncratic volatility under separated banking, as the
damage from common shocks is amplified in larger resolution costs.
5.5 Idiosyncratic vs systemic volatility shocks
When volatility is only temporarily higher, many of the same effects just described are
apparent. With universal banking, the economy reacts in a very similar way to both
systemic and idiosyncratic volatility shocks. Given that similarity, we do not report these
impulse responses. That similar response is not surprising when we recall that the default
rate chosen by the universal bank is proportional to the product of the systemic and
idiosyncratic shocks: bank j defaults if [et+1(j)]1−1/η ut+1 < εDt(j).
Figure 2 shows the effect of an AR(1) volatility shock, with persistence coeffi cients
ρσε = ρσu = 0.66, in an economy with separate banks.
34 These shocks are calibrated to
increase investment bank default by one percentage point over the baseline. In general,
higher volatility increases default as banks exploit the limited liability margin. At the
same time labour (and hence output) rises for precautionary reasons. However, resolution
costs as a proportion of total output also increase. This results in lower consumption and
welfare.
More specifically, for idiosyncratic shocks, the retail bank reacts by increasing the risk
premium and as a result the probability of default increases only slightly from 0.5% to
0.7%. As a result, the net welfare benefit from universal banking (bottom right panel) is
smaller, though still positive.
The systemic volatility shock is significantly more damaging under separated banking
as retail banks become riskier. They cannot hedge much of that increased risk via the
spread and limited liability makes risk-taking more profitable. That, in turn, increases the
excess costs of default and reduces consumption. The probability of retail banks’default
increases more than five-fold (up to 3%), average resolution costs rise from 0.5% to 0.9%
of GDP, and welfare drops by 0.6% in consumption equivalent. Thus universal banking
is even more attractive if a systemic volatility shock hits the economy. Overall, therefore,
higher volatility seems to establish a preference for universal banking on average.
34The simulated processes are given by σt−σ = ρσ (σt−1 − σ) , where ρσ is estimated on the annualized
CBOE Volatility Index, VIX. Details available on request.
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Fig 2. IB (investment bank) default, Spread, RB (retail bank) default, Costs/GDP
are in % values. Labour, GDP, C (Consumption) are log deviation from steady-state.
"Change in utility" is difference in consumption equivalent from steady-state. Difference in utility
UB-SB is between universal and separated banking in consumption equivalent for a given shock.
5.6 Prudential policy35
Table 2 suggests that making banks more responsible for their losses may be welfare
enhancing. So we focus here on something akin to capital requirements, a key regulatory
mechanism. Consider regulations that require average profits to be a certain proportion
of banks’liabilities: EtΠt+1 (Nt(j)) ≥ αIBWtRctNt(j), and EtΨt+1(Rct(i)) ≥ αRB(RhtBt(i) +
MBi ), for investment and retail banks respectively, where α
IB and αRB are chosen to
maximize household utility. The problem for the investment bank is set out in the
appendix, The solution reflects the key fact that there is an inverse relationship between
the mark-up and the planned default threshold µIBt = ∆
1−1/η
t /εDt. Now εDt is chosen so
that
εDt = (∆t)
1−1/η /µIBt = (∆t)
1−1/η /(αIB + 1).
35We acknowledge the input of a referee in encouragng us to undertake this experiment.
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That equation also determines µUBt for universal banking (although importantly we will
find that optimally αIB 6= αUB). And for the retail bank, the expected default threshold





= αRB + 1.
The results are presented in Table 5. The second column reports the baseline scenario from
Table 1. The third column shows what happens when optimal own funds requirements are
applied to retail, investment and universal banks, all else held at the baseline calibration.
The optimal spread falls from 3.3% to 1.8%, somewhat lower even than under unlimited
liability, while the investment bank spread, µIBt , increases from 15.7% to 19.46%, in turn
somewhat higher than under unlimited liability. As above, universal banking, this time
with optimal capital, welfare dominates separated banking at the baseline calibration. The
mark-up is once more larger than with no regulation, but less than with separated banks,
µUBt = 18.5%.
The basic insight from columns two and three is that regulators ought to permit
universal banking whilst simultaneously imposing substantive capital requirements. In
other words, universal banking is still preferred but, with optimal regulation, separated
banks are not so inferior as without regulation. Indeed universal banking now comes
with a slightly higher risk that ex post welfare would have been higher with separated
banks. Alternatively, if policymakers were, for whatever reason, unwilling to permit
universal banking, it is optimal to levy strict capital requirements on investment banks
while imposing antitrust measures on the retail banks36.
Why does optimal regulation of separate banks not make the economy more or less
identical to the universal banking economy? Or, why is it not optimal to impose zero mark-
up for retail banks? Under separated banking sometimes there are “double” resolution
costs. That is, retail banks sometimes fail while they are trying to resolve investment banks.
In that case, government steps in and resolves the retail banks thus ‘doubling’the resolution
cost. So the optimal spread is positive in the separated banking economy because it reduces
the probability of retail banks default and helps to avoid costly resolution. However, with
universal banks, there is no such double-counting so that the economy optimally needs less
capital. Consequently, capital requirements are higher with separated banking because the
costs of resolution are higher.
Column 4 builds on Table 3 (high resolution costs) and looks at optimal capital
36The smaller spread is also consistent with a capital subsidy for retail banks. However, the anti-trust
interpretation may be more appealing.
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requirements in the case where the unregulated economy with high τ g meant separated
banking was optimal37. It turns out that optimal own funds restore the preference for
universal banking although not so clearly as in the baseline. For just under 40% of shocks,





= 0.03%. It is also worth noting that in this scenario the
mark-up under universal banking is higher than investment banks’. That is because, given
the cost of resolution, it is optimal to drive sharply lower the default probability, compared
with the baseline. Indeed, this scenario sees the lowest default rate for retail banks, lower
even than under unlimited liability. Thus the retail bank spread is higher than in the
baseline with optimal capital, as are investment banks’and universal banks’.
Table 5. Optimal own funds (or capital) requirements
Baseline with high Baseline with
Baseline Baseline resolution cost* high volatility**
+ optimal policy + optimal policy + optimal policy
spread 3.3% 1.85% 2.02% 2.3%
µIBt 15.7% 19.55% 19.63% 20.71%
µUBt 15.7% 18.51% 20.61% 19.10%
ENUBt 0.9148 0.9061 0.9004 0.9047
ENSBt 0.9041 0.8971 0.8964 0.8929





0.20% 0.165% 0.03% 0.25%
Pr(IB default) 5.0% 2.12% 2.09% 2.01%
Pr(RB default) 0.5% 0.29% 0.17% 0.5%
Pr(UB default) 5.0% 2.70% 1.65% 2.86%
µSB,t 20.15% 22.32% 22.54% 23.62%






0.54% 0.24% 0.24% 0.26%
E
(
Y UBt −CUBt )
Y UBt
)
0.62% 0.33% 0.33% 0.36%
ECSBt 0.8977 0.8944 0.8937 0.8901
ECUBt 0.9076 0.9025 0.8969 0.9010
IB = investment bank, RB = retail bank UB = universal bank, SB = separated banks,
µXB,t, X = U, S: aggregate wedge under banking structure XB see (24).
*τ = 0.125; τ g= 0.25, as in Table 3 column 4. **σu= 0.03745 as in Table 4 column 4.
Finally, in Column 5 we look at the baseline with systemic uncertainty increased.38
Similar to Table 4, this reinforces the preference for universal banking, but unlike in Table
4, the probability of encountering a shock that makes separated banking preferable is very
37That was the conclusion of Table 3 column 4.
38Column 5 is thus the optimal capital analog of Table 4 column 4.
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low. High capital requirements on investment and universal banks coupled with a modest
uplift in the spread (compared to other scenarios in Table 5) ensure that the cost of bank
failure is contained, especially under universal banking.
The overall sense of the results in Table 5 is that policymakers ought to permit universal
banking while imposing capital requirements that make bank failure relatively rare. If
banks are separated, retail banks should almost never fail (avoiding double resolution
costs), whilst investment and universal banks may be permitted to fail every 50 or so years.
In any event, capital requirements should optimally reflect not just systemic volatility, but
also resolution costs, something in practice that appears not to be the case.
Whilst we regard these results as suggestive, they appear broadly consistent with some
recent findings in the literature. Begenau and Landvoigt (2016) build a general equilibrium
endowment model of commercial and shadow banks and analyze the effects of altering
capital requirements on commercial banks. They find that optimal capital requirements
trade-off reductions in liquidity services against an increase in the safety of the financial
sector. As in Begenau (2016), Davydiuk (2017) also focuses on tighter capital regulation
and finds a welfare gain.
6 Conclusion
Should financial intermediaries and banks be broken up to improve economic welfare and/or
financial and macroeconomic stability? Even in a simple model like the one just presented,
the answer is far from straightforward; underlying distortions act sometimes to reinforce
and sometimes to offset other distortions. However our model suggests some important
considerations.
First, it is worth restating: increased financial stability per se is not necessarily welfare-
enhancing. Vertical integration of banks implies higher production and lower prices for
financial services; the size of the economy is positively correlated with risk-taking. As
noted in Kareken andWallace (1978), that risk-taking may be excessive in the decentralized
equilibrium with deposit protection (and limited liability). However, it may also be too
low from an optimal policy perspective. We find that universal banks—which fail more
frequently in our model—are often welfare superior to separated banks.
Second, in our model, aligning banks’behavior with social welfare turns on some key
trade-offs. Agents wish to maximize the size of output and so wish to make production as
effi cient as possible. In our set-up, that often means permitting universal banking, even
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though it is more risky. Otherwise, compressing the retail spread whilst making investment
banks more resilient (via increased capital) is desirable. However, when the resolution of
failing banks by the government is costly, it may be preferable to break banks up.
Our model suggests many complex interactions can influence the welfare assessment of
universal and separated banks. It seems to us that we know relatively little empirically
about some of the key parameters we have identified as important (such as τ g, which is
significant in the sometimes contrasting messages of ex ante and ex post welfare). Building
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7 Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Investment bank profit maximization
In this appendix we discuss the solution to the investment bank profit maximization
problem (10).
First, note that aggregate price and demand relationships depend on both the macro
and banking shocks since the demand for financial intermediation depends on future TFP,
as in (6). The aggregate supply of the investment bank sector may be predicted as follows









= N t∆t, (33)








is the aggregate of idiosyncratic shocks across investment banks.
There is no strategic interaction amongst the banks and N t is treated as parametric by
each bank. So, combining (6), to solve for Qt+1, and (33) means that (10) can be written
as

























Expected, conditional profit can now be written as



















represents an ex-ante planned default threshold chosen by an individual bank
taking macroeconomic factors, Λt, as given. However, the ex-post default rate depends
on the realization of the product of shocks, st+1 := ut+1e(j)
1−1/η
t+1 , where st+1 is a random
variable with density f s(s). If st+1 > εDt(j), then the bank will realize positive profits,
otherwise profits are, in effect, zero. Hence, the complete investment banking problem can





















We proceed to the first order necessary conditions via a Lagrangian, L. Denoting by µ






































fs (st+1) dst+1 = 0, (39)













fs (st+1) dst+1. (40)
In a symmetric equilibrium with Nt
Nt(j)
= 1, and since the constraint implies εDt(j) = εDt =
Λt, one sees that εDt solves an integral equation (39).
Given the definition of Λt, (35), one may then compute the equilibrium revenue to cost










However, there may exist no, or many, solutions to the integral equation, (39). The
issues of existence, uniqueness and the second order conditions for the investment banking
problem are now addressed.
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7.1.1 Existence
To establish general conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution, we needs
additional structure on the distribution function.
Definition 2 We call the number A the supremum of the domain of the pdf f , if ∀x, x < A.
It follows that F (x) < 1, and lim
x→A
F (A) = 1. For the lognormal distribution A = +∞.














Proposition 4 There exists a solution to (39) if the inverse log hazard rate converges to






















(1− F (x))x −
η
η − 1 . (43)






= +∞ > 0. Consider the first fraction of (43). Since
both the numerator and the denominator converge to 0 and are differentiable, L’Hôpital’s






(1− F (x))x = limx→A
xf (x)













η − 1 = −
1
η − 1 . (44)
Since g30(x) is a continuous function which changes from positive to negative, there should
exist a solution to g30(x) = 0.
Corollary 5 If Assumption A1 is true, and x is the largest solution to g30(x) = 0 then ∀
x1 > x we have that g30(x1) ≤ 0.
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Proof. We will give a proof by contradiction. Assume that there is a solution, x, such
that g30(x) = 0 and there exists x1 > x, such that g30(x1) > 0. However, since Assumption
A1 holds, formula (44) obtains, and there is a solution x2 such that g30(x2) = 0 and
x2 > x1 > x. Therefore x is not the largest solution, and we have a contradiction.
From corollary 5 one also concludes that if x is the largest solution, g′30(x) ≤ 0 and
function g30(x) cannot change the sign from negative to positive at x.
7.1.2 Uniqueness and the second order conditions
Now, we may formulate a suffi cient condition for uniqueness of the solution to g30(x) = 0.
Assumption A2: The inverse log hazard rate, (1−F (x))
xf(x)
, is a strictly decreasing
function.39
Corollary 6 If distribution F satisfies Assumptions A1 and A2, then function g30(x)
changes sign only once from positive to negative.
Proof. We will give a proof by contradiction. Assume that there is a solution, x, such
that g30(x) = 0; and g′30(x) > 0. Therefore
g′30(x) =

















From Corollary 5 we know that there exists x2 > x, such that g30(x2) = 0, and g′30(x2) ≤ 0.
That implies that
1
η − 1 −
(1− F (x2))
x2f (x2)
6 0 6 1







6 (1− F (x2))
x2f (x2)
,
which contradicts Assumption A2.
Function g30(x) is continuous and Corollary 6 implies that it changes sign only once
from positive to negative which implies g′30(x) < 0. That solution therefore also satisfies
the second order conditions as g30(x) represents the FONC of the initial problem.
Therefore, if the distribution satisfies Assumptions A1 and A2, there is a unique solution
x to g30(x) = 0 at which function g30(x) changes sign from positive to negative. Only at
this solution are both the first and the second order conditions satisfied.
39A suffi cient condition is a strictly increasing and unbounded log hazard ratio. It is interesting to note
that, in a similar context, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) deduce the same condition.
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Lognormal distribution It remains now to verify that the lognormal distribution







































= σ2/(x−µ), condition (47) is true
for the lognormal function and A1 is satisfied.40
Moreover, Thomas (1971) shows that the normal distribution has an increasing hazard
rate. Therefore its inverse hazard rate is a decreasing function and assumption A2 is
satisfied. It follows that for the lognormal distribution the solution exists. As a result, the
solution is unique and the second order conditions are satisfied.
7.2 Investment bank capital regulation and unlimited liability
In this section we look at two versions of the above model. The first is a simple version
of profitability requirements the numerical results of which we discussed in the main text,
and the second is the case of unlimited liability.
First, consider the case where the investment bank is required to attain a target for own
funds (profitability). That is, EΠ (Nt(j)) > αWtRctNt(j) where α captures the regulatory
requirement; in our model, it is akin to a capital requirement since banks are required to
aim for a certain profit margin. Thus, the total expected profit can be computed as

























f(s)ds = α + 1. In a symmetric
equilibriumN t/Nt(j) = 1 and∆
1−1/η
t /εDt = α+1.
41 Therefore, with this policy government








controls the mark-up of the investment banking sector as µIBt = (∆t)
1−1/η /εDt = α + 1.
This is the basis of the numerical results reported above.
Next consider the case when we abolish limited liability. One way to improve financial
stability, as noted in the main text, is to impose prudential regulations which would make
financial institutions more accountable for their loses. A profits target is one and unlimited
liability is another. Here the investment bank has to confront all losses and so maximizes



































fs (st+1) dst+1 = 0. (49)







t and it is smaller than Λt as defined in (39).
Proposition 7 If Λt exists, then Λt > Λ0
Proof: Recall that from our analysis above that Λt(1− F s(Λt))− η−1η
+∞∫
Λt
sf s (s) ds = 0;
































(Λt − s) fs (s) ds−
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That proves that Λ0 > Λt.
To understand the economic implications of this recall that Λt determines the demand
for labour such that a larger Λt is associated with higher wages and higher demand for
labour. Therefore, ceteris paribus, limiting bank liability increases the demand for labour
and thus implies higher output in the economy as a whole. It is also the case that the
investment bank wedge µIBt is smaller under limited liability. When liability is unlimited
and the investment banks entirely account for their losses, the corresponding mark-up









7.3 Appendix B: Retail bank profit maximization
To set out the retail bank’s optimization problem one first needs to solve for the proportion
of the loan book that will end up non-performing.
Proposition 8 The average recovery rate on loans to the investment banking sector,
ΓIB(ut+1), depends on the common shock, ut+1, the planned default threshold εDt, and





















Proof. The definition of the default threshold (51) follows directly from (12). At period




















. Therefore, the borrower is in default if e(j)t+1
eD(ut+1)
< 1.








After averaging over all possible idiosyncratic shocks, one obtains the average recovery rate
conditioning on the realisation of the macro shocks, u, as in (50).
With these calculations in place, we now consider the profit optimization problem of
the retail bank, which is set out in Section 2.5.
Given the information on the likelihood of losses on loans to investment banks, the
profit of the retail bank conditional on the realization of aggregate shocks will be
Ψt+1(R
c












Using the demand for loans (14) and noting that for a given Rct(i) there is a threshold
value of the common shock, yt(i), below which the retail bank will default, the expected




















































; y := yt(i); and u = ut+1.


















fu(u)du = 0. (55)
There exists a solution to (55) which also satisfies the second order conditions. This is
established presently. First, we note that the equilibrium spread in the retail bank sector
reflects market power as well as the probability of losses plus the costs of loss resolution.
It is useful to establish some basic properties of the function G(u). We do this in:
Proposition 9 G(u) is an increasing function. Moreover G(0) = 0 and lim
u→∞
G(u) = 1.





η−1 and note that dx
du
< 0; Thus








































Existence of retail banks’default threshold







δ − 1G(y). (56)
One may now show that the solution to the first order condition (55) exists if and only if
there is a solution to g12(y) = 0. Moreover, the first order condition’s solution, y, satisfies
the second order condition to problem (52) if and only if g′12(y) < 0.






δ − 1 < 0. (57)
and there exists a y such that g12(y) = 0, and g′12(y) < 0.
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It is easy to see that g12(0) ≥ 0. However lim
y→∞
g12(y) < 0. Therefore, as g12(·) is a continuous
function, there is a solution at which g12(y) = 0 and g12(y) changes sign from positive to
negative. At this point g′12(y) < 0 and the second order conditions are also satisfied. The
proof is complete.






Proof. First we will show that dy
dδ
> 0 applying the implicit function theorem to
g12(y, δ) = 0; Lemma 10 proves that
∂g12
∂y
< 0 and ∂g12
∂δ
= 1







> 0, the default threshold, the probability of default, increases with δ.
Since the spread = 1/G(y), and G(y) is an increasing function, the spread declines with
competition.
One can summarize important properties of the solution to the retail bank’s problem,
thus:
Proposition 12 Profit maximization implies that the spread is inversely related to the




ΓIB(yt)−τω(yt) . In equilibrium, the
default threshold yt depends on the distribution of the common shock, ut+1, competitiveness
in retail banking, δ, the planned default of the investment bank, εDt, and resolution costs
τ which we discuss further below. The first order conditions imply that in a symmetric









fut (ut+1)dut+1 = 0. (58)










As in the investment banking sector, the spread which is also the mark-up in retail
banking, plays an important role in financial stability. Formula (59) implies that:
Proposition 13 The recovery rate, ΓRB(ut+1), weakly increases in the credit spread.
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Propositions 11, 12 and 13 are the key statements about the solution to the retail bank’s
optimization problem.
Proposition 14 Other things constant, the proportion of deposits recovered by households,
Γ, increases in the spread, µRBt .
Proof. First, note from (6) and (13) that Yt+1
NtWtRht
= ut+1×µFt ×µIBt ×µRBt . From (59)
and (20), we obtain the following expressions for the deposit recovery rates









It is now easy to see that Γ weakly increases with the credit spread µRBt .
7.4 Appendix C: Equilibrium and model equations
A decentralized equilibrium is a set of plans, {Ct+k, Yt+k, Nt+k, Wt+k, Rht+k}∞k=0, given
initial conditions, {At−1, Nt−1, Rht−1,Wt−1}, and exogenous shocks, {ut+k}
∞
k=0 , satisfying
equations (M1)-(M5 ) in Table 6.
Table 6. Model Equations







Labour supply WtUc(Ct) = VN (Nt) (M2)




Final goods production Yt+1 = Ãtut+1Nt (M4)
Resource constraint Ct = Yt(1− ξ(ut)) (M5)
Here we use Ãt := A
ρ
t∆t and µ̃t := µ
F
t × µIBt , where recall that µFt is the monopolistic
pricing mark-up attached to final goods and µIBt is the wedge in the investment banking
sector defined in equation (13). We discuss these wedges in the main text. Product
ξ(ut) × Yt represents the costs of financial distress which includes monitoring costs, Mt,
and the cost of government intervention associated with bailout, gGt.
Combining (M2) and (M3) and assuming CRRA utility with Uc = C−κ, κ ∈ (0, 1), we
can derive a closed form solution for labour











Γ(ut+1) [ut+1 (1− ξ(ut+1))]−κ
µ̃t × µRBt
. (62)
These last two equations are very useful as they summarize how default and bailout costs
and banking wedges impact the size of the economy under differing banking structures.
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the costs of financial distress which includes monitoring costs, Mt, and the excess cost of
government intervention associated with a bailout, gGt.
Specifically, these functions are defined as:
ξU (ut) =
τgω (ut) + gmin
(







τω (ut) + τ
gΓRB(ut)× Idef + gmin
(




ut × µ̃t × µRBt
(64)
Functions ξU modify the costs to GDP ratio under universal banking, and Idef is a
default indicator function, Idef = 1 if ut < yt−1; Idef = 0 otherwise.
The financial structure of the economy will directly affect the Euler equation, (M1), the
demand for labor (M3), and the resource constraint, (M5). The above block of equations
can be used to derive tractable, closed-form expressions for equilibrium consumption,
labour and the deposit rate in a way that helps us characterize quite compactly the impact
of financial structure on the economy. Combining equations (M1-M3) we obtain a modified




× VN (Nt) (65)




= ut+1 × µ̃t × µRBt .






And so, using the Euler Equation (65) one can solve for equilibrium labour as a function














× VN (Nt). (66)
And with CRRA utility we can simplify this as










(ut+1 (1− ξ(ut+1)))−κ ΓJ(ut+1).
µ̃t × µRBt
(68)





depends crucially on the financial structure of the economy. When the economy suffers
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from a number of monopolistic distortions, a financial structure which stimulates labour
supply will reduce the deadweight loss and increase effi ciency and social welfare. Finally,
note that the expectations operator, Et, in formula (67) indicates integration over all
possible realizations of the common shock ut+1. Thus the equilibrium value of labour does
not depend on the shock and labour is constant if the distribution of the shock does not
change over time.
7.5 The costs of financial stability
The following proposition establishes the claims made in the text in Section 2 that
resolution costs decline with the profitability of retail banking, µRBt .
Proposition 15 The loss in consumption due to resolution costs declines with the spread.
Moreover, the private monitoring (i.e., resolution) costs to GDP ratio strongly declines in
the spread, while government monitoring and deposit insurance costs weakly decline in the
spread.






, strictly declines in the spread. When retail banks are in default, ut+1 < yt the cost








































also clearly declines in the spread µRBt .
7.6 Appendix D: The households wedge: µHt
We refer to the product of the banking and goods production sector wedges as the
"production wedge": µmt := µ
F
t ×µIBt ×µRBt . The marginal cost of this integrated production
line is RhtWt and the expected marginal benefit is EtFN(Nt). Recall, it is appropriate to
include the expectations operator here because time t labour produces time t+ 1 output.
So it follows that
EtFN (Nt) = µ
m
t ×RhtWt. (69)
42Recall, µ̃ := µF × µIB .
45
We then define the "household wedge" by
Et [Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt)] = µ
H
t × µmt × VN (Nt) . (70)
If government intervention were costless and there were no other monitoring costs then
Yt+1 = Ct+1, and the household wedge is simply the residual after the production wedge is
accounted for, µt = µ
H
t × µmt . Combining (70) and first order conditions (3) and (69), the
household wedge can be written as µHt = µ
HN
t × µHDt , where
µHNt :=
Et [Uc(Ct+1)FN (Nt, ut+1)]





7.7 Appendix E: TFP impulse response functions
The full nonlinear model, solved in closed form above, can be analyzed easily using
impulse response analysis. First we examine an unexpected shock to productivity, ut.
We simulate the economy where the common shock equals its average value, ut = 1, in
every period except period 1, when it declines by its standard deviation, u1 = exp(−σu).
Figure 3 presents log-deviations in labour, GDP, consumption, wages and labour effi ciency.
The cost of resolution, bank default, the deposit rate and the difference in consumption
equivalents are all presented as deviations from the steady state. The reaction to the
negative productivity shock is clearly very similar under both separate and universal
banking systems.
Overall, Figure 3 shows that the model economy responds in an intuitive way
to a temporary negative TFP shock. For the most part, the responses are virtually
indistinguishable across bank structures. The temporary shock has a persistent effect
lowering expected future TFP and so reducing labour supply and therefore future
production. On top of that, the unexpected decline in the current period increases the
default rate of investment banks. As a result, the fall in consumption in the first period
is amplified by a relatively large increase in resolution costs. Wages fall as deposit rates
rise. The latter reflects the fact that there is a ‘shortage’of loanable funds, pushing up
interest rates. The bottom right plot shows that there is a temporary welfare dominance
of separated banking over universal banking because of the relatively small increase in
resolution costs.
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Figure 3. Response to shock in u (negative TFP shock)




























































7.8 Universal vs separated banking with an extremely adverse
shock
Figure 4 shows that universal banking is preferable when the systemic shock is so
unfavourable that the retail banks also default. In that case the government needs to
step in and resolve failing retail banks. The resolution costs grow dramatically from 1.5%
of GDP in normal times to almost 10% of GDP. This is not the case in universal banking
for a shock of a similar size as resolution costs rise but more incrementally.
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Figure 4. Relative performance of universal vs separated banking
with an extremely adverse shock, F (u) ≤ 1%











































 UB-SB, CE %
The probability of shock, F (u), is on horizontal axes
IB (investment bank) default, Costs/GDP, C (Consumption), Rh (deposit rate)
are in % values. UB-SB is difference in utility between universal and separated
banking in consumption equivalent for a given shock.
48
